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INTRODUCTION

The largely statutory appearance of U.S. administrative law should not
be surprising in light of the existence of the federal Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).' The APA, including its additions and
amendments, is a relatively comprehensive guide to much of administrative
law in the United States. It contains the procedures agencies are supposed
to follow in both rulemaking and adjudication and provisions on the
availability and scope of judicial review of agency action. As amended, it
includes open meeting and open file requirements as well as procedures for
negotiated rulemaking and legislative review of agency rules. Add in the
generally held view that federal courts should not make common law but
should act only when and how they are statutorily authorized to act, and it
is understandable that administrative law takes on a strong statutory
appearance.
Thus, although common law pops up explicitly on occasion in the odd
quarter of administrative law, by and large the law of judicial review
appears to be statutory and it is understood that way by most lawyers. Note
the word "appears." Scratch below the surface, and the federal courts may
not actually behave all that differently than court systems with an openly
acknowledged common law tradition in administrative law. While the
federal courts have always been statutorily authorized to employ the writs
that English courts used in the common law of judicial review, 2 the courts
have, since the enactment of the APA, been reluctant to be open about
their use of common law in the administrative law arena, especially when a
statute contains an answer or even the germ of an answer. Even when the
federal courts rely on pre-APA case law or principles, courts usually filter
this law through the lens of the APA.
The purpose of this Article is to uncover the statutory veneer of federal
administrative law and reveal ways in which federal courts behave like
common law courts, creating administrative law based on principles and
policies that may or may not be consistent with the language, structure, and
history of the APA and other relevant provisions. I will also highlight areas
in which the Supreme Court has required a more statutory focus as a
matter of contrast with the common law aspects of administrative law to
illustrate that the Court has not provided, or even attempted to provide, a
principled justification for its continued use of administrative common law.
Last, this Article shows that the courts have not provided a method for
1.

Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5

U.S.C. (2006)).
2.

See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (current version at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651 (2006)).
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choosing between a statutory or common law focus in any particular
doctrinal area.
A clarification of the term "common law" is in order at this point. While
common law may have originally referred to a body of law thought to exist
in common across jurisdictions under generally accepted standards of legal
reasoning, I use the term here to distinguish statutory law made by
legislators from case law made by courts. It is well understood that each
state has its own common law, crafted by its courts under the supervision of
the state supreme court, subject only to the supremacy of federal statutory
and constitutional law. 3 In many contexts, including administrative law,
courts use statutes and constitutional text as jumping-off points for a degree
of creativity beyond that expected of a court engaged in the construction
and application of an authoritative text. These courts apply a common law
methodology in two separate but related senses. The first sense is that
courts often make administrative law in areas ostensibly governed by the
APA with little or no regard for the actual language or intent of the statute.
Second, this law is then applied using the common law method of
elaboration and development, so that doctrinal systems governing
important areas of administrative law become so well-developed that it
becomes virtually unnecessary to refer to the text of the APA when deciding
cases concerning APA provisions.
This is not the first analysis of the relationship between the APA and the
common law of judicial review in the United States. Kenneth Culp Davis
examined the issue in 1980 and concluded that "most administrative law
[in the United States] is judge-made law" and that the law in the long run
4
will reject efforts to transform administrative law into a statutory discipline.
John Duffy concluded otherwise in 1998, arguing that administrative law
was following a trend away from federal common law toward a more
statutory basis. 5 With the benefit of another decade of developments, Davis
appears to have the better of the arguments, although Duffy may actually
have been expressing not a conclusion but a hope-based on a particular
case in which the Supreme Court took a strongly statutory perspectivethat the entire body of administrative law would move in the statutory
direction. It is, however, more of a spectrum than a dichotomy with courts

3. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). There are small pockets of
federal common law, for example, the law governing federally issued negotiable instruments
and the preclusive effects of federal court judgments, but this federal common law exists only
in the tiniest fraction of subject areas.
4. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion,
1980 UTAH L. REv. 3, 3.
5. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview, 77 TEX. L. REv. 113, 115
(1998).
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paying more or less attention to enacted law across the range of
administrative law subjects. The most that one can confidently say today is
that administrative law contains elements that appear to be highly
statutorily focused alongside elements in which courts exercise the
6
discretion of a common law court.
In this Article, I analyze two of the many sets of administrative law issues
that could be explored under this rubric: the law of administrative
procedure and the availability and scope of judicial review of agency action.
In the procedural area I look at rulemaking procedure, the timing and
availability-including preclusion-of judicial review, and standing to seek
judicial review. In the more substantive area of the scope of review, I look
at two issues: judicial review of agency statutory interpretation and the
general standard governing judicial review of agency policy decisions. In
both areas, the operative question is whether courts reviewing agency
action for procedural or substantive regularity are following governing
statutes or applying judicially created norms.
Before turning to the analysis, it is necessary to confront a sensible
challenge to this project. My thesis is that U.S. administrative law is
fashioned from a combination of statutory law and common law doctrines
without any strong indication of which, if either, is more appropriate than
the other in any particular context. There is another view, however, that
also ought to be considered. Perhaps the dichotomy identified in this
Article is a false one, and even in those situations that I have placed furthest
toward the common law end of the spectrum, the courts are merely
engaged in traditional statutory construction and gap filling that is well
within the historical practice of judges in common law countries. Most of
the decisions examined construe language of governing statutes, most
notably the APA. When courts have gone too far and abandoned statutory
fidelity altogether, the Supreme Court has brought them back in line.
While I appreciate this view of judicial practice as applied to
administrative law, in my view, for the reasons largely expressed in the
body of this Article, it obscures more than it reveals. Rather, the
dichotomy or spectrum concerning common law methodology and

6. The issue of common law versus statutory methodology is often relevant to
administrative law analysis even if it has not often been the central focus. More recent

publications have cast at least a glancing blow at the subject. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 479, 508-10 (2010)

(discussing how the nonstatutory nature of administrative law allows constitutional principles
to become part of "ordinary administrative law"); Noga Morag-Levine, Agenqy Statutory
Interpretationand the Rule of Common Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 52-60 (2009) (describing

the evolution of common law principles in England that limited the lawmaking powers of
agencies).
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adherence to authoritative statutes reveals important features of
administrative law. Not only does the dichotomy or spectrum exist, but the
decisions also do not explain why in some contexts a statutory focus is
appropriate while in other contexts it is not. With no indication of a trend
in either direction, and no way to choose a methodology in advance in any
particular context, it appears that administrative law does not satisfy basic
rule of law requirements.

I.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

The APA prescribes detailed procedures for formal 7 and informal
rulemaking, 8 and for formal adjudication. 9 Unless a more specific statute
provides otherwise, federal agencies are required to follow the procedures
specified in the APA. Given the concentrated attention Congress paid to
administrative procedure in the APA, l0 this area would seem to be a prime
candidate for judicial modesty in the sense that a court reviewing
administrative procedure would require agencies to follow the APA and
other statutorily mandated procedures and nothing more. However, as we
shall see, despite adherence by the Supreme Court to the principle that
courts should not require agencies to employ procedures beyond those
required by statute, this is not how the law regarding judicial review of
administrative procedure has developed.
A.

Informal Rulemaking Procedure

Let us use informal rulemaking as our main example. The APA
establishes a bare bones rulemaking procedure that is used in the vast
majority of agency rulemaking proceedings. This procedure, referred to as
"informal" or "notice-and-comment rulemaking," requires notice of the
proposed rulemaking, opportunity for interested persons to comment on
the proposed rules, and a "concise general statement of their basis and
purpose" of any rules actually adopted.'" In the very earliest decisions
construing the APA, the federal courts applied the requirements of the APA
7.
8.
9.
10.

5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (2006).
Id. § 553.
Id. §§ 554, 556-557.
See Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 480 (9th Cir. 1952) ("We take

judicial notice of the prolonged campaign to secure passage of the APA and the fact that few
pieces of legislation passed in recent years received more attention at the hands of Congress.
During its consideration the entire field of administration procedure and judicial review of
administrative orders was subjected to searching scrutiny in order to develop a more orderly
pattern in this area of law ... ").
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). There is also a provision for formal rulemaking in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but that procedure is rarely used. See id. §§ 556-557.

ADMINSTRATIVE LI WRE VIEW

[63:1

primarily with reference to the text, perhaps because of the recognition that
Congress paid a great deal of attention to the finer points of administrative
procedure when it drafted the APA.
As time went on, and perhaps the memory of the concentrated political
attention to the details of administrative procedure faded, close adherence
to the text of the APA broke down. By the late 1960s, federal courts
entertaining challenges to the results of informal rulemakings adjusted
procedural requirements based on their own sense of best practices in light
of the importance and complexity of the particular rulemaking proceeding.
The courts treated the APA as setting a floor, but employed a common law
methodology to determine the appropriate level of procedure in each
particular proceeding. In other words, courts would require agencies to
provide procedures over and above those specific in the APA when they
found that issues were too important or complex to be determined via such
a sparse procedural framework.
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 12 firmly rejected this practice as
inconsistent with the statutory scheme embodied in the APA. The Court
held that courts may not require procedures other than those specified in
the APA or another applicable statute, except in "extremely compelling
circumstances" or when an agency makes "a totally unjustified departure
13
from well-settled agency procedures of long standing."
In the Vermont Yankee decision itself, the Court held that agencies could
not be ordered to allow cross-examination or other trial-type procedures in
proceedings governed by the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking
provisions. 14 The Court later extended the Vermont Yankee rule to less formal
decisionmaking processes, 15 and the black letter rule in U.S. law is that
courts generally may not require agencies to adopt procedures other than
those required by statute, including the APA, unless such procedures are
constitutionally deficient. 16 While the Court supported its decision with
policy arguments concerning uniformity and predictability, it drew those
arguments, and most of the support for its decision, from the statute and its
legislative history. The Court viewed the role of courts engaged in judicial
review of administrative procedure as enforcing the standards imposed by
Congress rather than as creating a system of agency best procedural
12. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
13. Id. at 542-43. For a more complete review of the Vermont rankee decision and its
current application-or nonapplication-see Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson,
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 856 (2007).
14. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543.
15. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
16. See Beermann & Lawson, supra note 13, at 871-72.
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practices.
Despite this apparently clear directive, lower federal courts have
persisted in applying a common law method to procedural questions arising
under the APA's rulemaking provisions. Perhaps this should not be
surprising. Kenneth Culp Davis attacked Vermont rankee as inconsistent with
the traditional common law powers of U.S. courts and with the APA itself,
which explicitly preserves "additional requirements imposed by statute or
otherwise recognized by law."'17 Davis predicted that "[t]he law in the long run
will reject the Vermont Yankee opinion and is tending to do so in the short
run."' 18 His prediction and characterization of the post- Vermont rankee case
law has proven half right. Although Vermont rankee itself has not been
repudiated, and in fact has been reaffirmed, the lower federal courts
continue in many areas to shape administrative procedure in a common
law process without much reference to the text and history of the APA.

B. Notice of ProposedRulemaking
The best example of continued federal court creativity despite Vermont
Yankee is the application of the § 553 requirement that agencies provide
notice of the "terms or substance of... proposed rule [s] or a description of
the subjects and issues involved."' 19 In cases arising shortly after the APA
was adopted, the federal courts stuck to the statutory language and rejected
challenges to the adequacy of agency notices of proposed rulemaking
whenever the notice met the statutory minima by specifying the subjects
and issues involved in the rulemaking, as required by the APA. 20 More

17. See Davis, supra note 4, at 10 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006)).
Davis concluded that "otherwise recognized by law" must refer to common law.
18. Id. at 13. John Duffy pointed out more recently that Vermont Yankee itself was a
common law decision because it relied on pre-APA precedent for its central holding and
because it allowed for exceptions to its rule-for extremely compelling circumstances and
departures from long standing agency practices-that are not provided for in the APA or
any other statute. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 182. Duffy finds a statutory basis for Vermont
Yankee in APA § 706(2)(D)'s requirement that courts set aside "agency action reached
'without observance of procedure required by law."' Id. at 186. He interprets "law" as
limited to the APA and to other governing statutes. Id.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3).
20. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 209 F.2d 717, 723-24 (10th
Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 492 (1955); Owensboro on the Air, Inc. v. United
States, 262 F.2d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Logansport Broad. Corp. v. United States, 210
F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In Logansport, for example, the court rejected the argument
that the notice was insufficient because the agency departed from the priorities announced
in the notice and decided the matter based on a consideration not previously announced-a
determination that very high frequency (VHF)television stations should be allocated to
larger cities. It seems fairly clear that under current law in the federal courts of appeals, the
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recently, however, even after Vermont rankee, lower federal courts have
imposed nonstatutory tests such as requirements that the final rule be a
"logical outgrowth" of the notice or that the final rule not materially alter
the proposal. 2 1 Courts have also required that agencies provide public
notice of information or studies they considered when formulating the final
22
rule.

Courts support these decisions with arguments based on fairness to the
parties interested in the rulemakings and on the quality of the rules likely to
be produced with better notice. From one perspective, this is consistent
with the traditional role of courts engaged in statutory construction, which
is to apply the language and intent of the statute in a way that makes sense
in light of the policies underlying the statutory scheme. However, the
requirements entailed in these tests are elaborated and clarified in a case
law process largely detached from the language and intent behind the
APA's rulemaking provisions, rendering the entire enterprise inconsistent

with the statutory method for applying the APA's procedural provisions
apparently required by the Supreme Court in Vermont rankee.
Although the notice decisions seem to be in tension with the Vermont
Yankee rule, the Supreme Court appears to have embraced the lower courts'
general approach to notice. In a recent decision rejecting a challenge to a
rule based on inadequate notice, the Court framed the issue as follows:
The Administrative Procedure Act requires an agency conducting noticeand-comment rulemaking to publish in its notice of proposed rulemaking
"either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
The Courts of Appeals have generally
subjects and issues involved."
interpreted this to mean that the final rule the agency adopts must be "a
'logical outgrowth' of the rule proposed."... The object, in short, is one of
23
fair notice.

agency would be required to disclose its new decision rule in a second notice so that
interested parties could comment on the potential basis for the decision. But see Am. Med.
Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a challenge to the notice
based on significant change from proposal to final rule).
21. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985).
22. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This
requirement had been rejected in the earlier and more statutorily oriented decision in
Logansport. 210 F.2d at 28. More recently, D.C. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh has questioned
whether this requirement is consistent with Vermont Yankee. See Am. Radio Relay League,
Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
23. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007) (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); Nat'l Black Media Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986));
also citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
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The Supreme Court did not firmly endorse the lower courts'
understanding of the notice requirement, but there is no hint of discomfort
with it. At least for the foreseeable future, the federal courts are likely to
continue to apply the logical outgrowth test and related doctrines when
evaluating the sufficiency of agency notice of proposed rules.
C. Ex Parte Comments
Another area in which federal courts continue to impose procedural
requirements and restrictions on agencies that are not supported by any
statute involves agency receipt of ex parte communications during informal
rulemaking proceedings. The APA says nothing about these, and because
the APA explicitly prohibits them in formal proceedings, the best statutory
argument is that they are allowed in informal rulemaking. 24 Some lower
courts, however, have banned them, perhaps for good reason-they
facilitate favoritism and fuel suspicion. 25 However, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit recently ruled against a ban on ex parte contacts outside the formal
adjudication context based on the panel's reading of Vemont Yankee. 26 This
is a small step in extending Vermont Yankee beyond what the Supreme Court
has explicitly required.
D. Availability and Timing ofJudicialReview
The APA regulates the availability and timing of judicial review. This
includes a specification of what agency actions are reviewable and
27
unreviewable, who may seek judicial review, and when review is available.
In this area, the federal courts at times follow the statutory language fairly
closely and insist on a statutory method, while at other times they engage in
a much freer, common-law-like methodology.
1. Reviewable Agency Action
As the APA specifies, "Agency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review." 2 8 The first half of this provision is
cert. denied sub nom. Lead Indus. Assn., Inc. v. Donovan, 453 U.S. 913 (198 1); S. Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d).
25. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977);

Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
26. Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n v. Mar. Admin., 215 F.3d 37, 42-43 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
27. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-704.
28. Id. § 704.
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redundant; the second, according to the Supreme Court, creates a
presumption that all final agency action is subject to judicial review of some
sort. 29 The vague language of the second half of this provision-"final
30
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court" -- is
intended to clarify that when judicial review of a category of agency action
is provided for in a statute other than the APA, that statute's judicial review
provisions take precedence over the APA's and continue in force. This is
sensible statutory reasoning: normally, a more specific statute takes
precedence over a general statute. The APA basically admits that it is
meant to provide review in those cases in which review is not otherwise
available.
This picture of specific statutes providing review with an APA backstop
for other situations is incomplete. There is another category of review,
denominated "nonstatutory review," under which courts review agency
action that is covered neither by a specific review provision nor by the
APA. 31 These challenges to agency action include petitions for mandamus,
general federal question equity actions, and actions for declaratory relief
under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The term nonstatutoy review is
a misnomer, since these forms of nonstatutory review depend at least to
some extent on various statutes including the APA itself, which provides
that if judicial review under the APA is inadequate or unavailable, the
challenger may employ "any applicable form of legal action, including
actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory
injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction." 32 This
goes hand in hand with the APA provision relied upon by Davis for the
proposition that Congress did not intend for the APA to displace the federal
33
courts' traditional common law powers in administrative law.
In the absence of these nonexclusivity provisions in the APA, given the
complex nature of the APA and the concentrated attention that was
29. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993) ("[W]e have read the APA as
embodying a 'basic presumption ofjudicial review."') (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
31. Nonstatutory review has been asserted as a means of reviewing presidential actions
that are not reviewable under the APA. See generally Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the
President's Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1171 (2009); Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the
President:Nonstatutogy Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1612, 1613-14 (1997). For a more
general look at nonstatutory review, see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law,
122 HARv. L. REv. 1095, 1115-17 (2009), and Clark Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal
"Nonstatutogy" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible Parties,Mandamus, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1479, 1479-83 (1962).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 703.
33. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 559).
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involved in its framing, there would have been strong arguments against
preservation of review outside the APA. It might have been wise to
presume that the APA constituted the exclusive means to challenge agency
action, and if an action under the APA is not available, no review is
available. As appealing as this reasoning might be in other contexts, it is
inconsistent with the language and intent of the APA.
The question then becomes what law determines the availability of these
nonstatutory remedies such as mandamus, certiorari, and injunctions. The
answer turns out to be federal common law. (It may seem odd to use the
term "common law" since these are technically considered equitable
remedies. The term is used here to denote judicial action based on the
traditional powers of courts in the absence of enacted substantive law.)
There are some statutory aspects; from the very beginning, in the All Writs
Act, Congress granted federal courts the power to employ the traditional
writs known to courts at that time. 34 These remedies may also be entailed
in the judicial power granted to the federal courts in Article III of the
Constitution, which means that they would exist even without Congress's
permission. Further, various statutes grant federal courts jurisdiction over
actions for mandamus, habeas corpus, and suits in equity arising under
federal law.
Even if congressional permission is necessary for federal courts to grant
the traditional remedies of non-APA judicial review, no federal statute
specifies the conditions under which each remedy should be granted. By
specifying that writs must be "agreeable to the usages and principles of
law," 35 the All Writs Act in effect delegates this determination to the courts.
In administrative law, federal courts fashion appropriate actions and
remedies where the APA and other specific regulatory statutes do not fulfill
the task, applying the same common law methodology they employed
before passage of the APA.
Thus the entitlement to judicial review comprises both statutory and
nonstatutory elements. Because most judicial review arises under the APA,
little attention has been paid to the nonstatutory aspects of judicial review,
but in light of the APA's explicit provision for nonstatutory methods of
review, it remains an important aspect of U.S. administrative law.

34. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(2006)).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
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2. Exceptions to the Availability ofJudicialReview
The APA creates two broad exceptions to the availability of judicial
review. First, judicial review is not available when another statute
precludes it. Second, judicial review is not available when "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."' 36 The former exception is highly
statutory, and the federal courts look to the language and intent of statutes
to determine whether review is precluded. Statutes precluding review are
relatively rare and are somewhat disfavored, with the Supreme Court
interpreting them relatively narrowly.
The exception to review for when agency action is committed to agency
discretion has statutory and common law elements. The statutory phrase
"committed to agency discretion by law" is ambiguous because it cannot
mean that every discretionary action by an agency is unreviewable. That
would undercut a central purpose of judicial review, ensuring that agencies
do not abuse the discretion they are granted, and it would be inconsistent
with the APA's specification that agency action is unlawful and should be
set aside if it involves an abuse of discretion. 37 As the Supreme Court
recognized, this exception was meant to incorporate pre-APA common law.
However, in its first discussion of this provision, the Court ignored an
important aspect of the pre-APA law of reviewability, stating that under this
exception, agency action is unreviewable only if, in a particular matter, the
standards governing agency action are so vague that there is, in effect, no
law to apply.38 This inquiry is highly discretionary, calling on federal courts
to engage in a common-law-like analysis of whether a particular agency
statute meets some standard of vagueness as understood in the case law.
More importantly, the Court completely ignored the pre-APA
understanding that judicial review is not available when a statute grants
discretion in terms of the personal judgment of an official, using phrases
39
such as "in his judgment" to describe the conditions for executive action.
The APA's language was meant to incorporate this doctrine, and this
oversight was remedied later when the Court found no review of actions
under a statute granting the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) the power to terminate the employment of any agency employee
when he "'shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States."' 40 The Court noted that the inclusion of the
36. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
37. Id. § 706(2)(A).
38. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 413-14 (1971).
39. See, e.g., United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 376-77, 379-80
(1940).

40. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988) (emphasis omitted) (holding that an
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word "deem" indicated that Congress meant for this authority to be a
personal decision of the agency director, not questionable in court or any
other forum. 41 Although the Court formally stuck to the "no law to apply"
interpretation of the provision, it strained to include "deeming clause"
provision in its understanding of when there is no law to apply. This
remedied the Court's earlier neglect of this important aspect of the preAPA common law of reviewability, which Congress had intended to
incorporate into the APA.
Later, Justice Scalia convinced the Court that the common law should
have an even greater role in its reviewability jurisprudence than had existed
before the passage of the APA. In his separate opinion in Webster, he
argued that the phrase "by law" in the APA's judicial review exception
refers generally to a common law of review under which certain categories
of agency action were exempt from judicial review. 42 He also implied that
43
personnel decisions by the CIA Director are one such category. Justice
Scalia's argument is interesting, and it may even be normatively persuasive,
but it has absolutely no support in either the language or the history of the
APA or in pre-APA common law. Even the Supreme Court decision that
most strongly supports the argument that some categories are exempt from
judicial review, involving agency prosecutorial discretion, carefully adhered
to the "no law to apply" understanding of the statutory exemption. In line
with that reasoning, the Court recognized that agency action within the
category is subject to judicial review if clear statutory standards govern the
exercise of the otherwise unreviewable discretion. 44
Despite the doubtful pedigree ofJustice Scalia's categorical approach to
nonreviewability, in a decision just a few years following his separate
opinion advocating the approach, a majority of the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Souter, adopted this reasoning and announced that "[o]ver the
years, we have read [APA] § 70 1(a)(2) to preclude judicial review of certain
categories of administrative decisions that courts traditionally have
regarded as 'committed to agency discretion. ' ' 45 For this assertion, Justice
Souter's authority consisted of one concurring opinion and one dissenting
opinion, raising the question of what he meant by "we" in the statement.

executive officer's actions are not subject to review if the actions are necessary, appropriate,
and in accordance with legislation) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 4 0 3 (c) (1988)).
41. Id.at 600.
42. Id. at 608-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); see also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 566-68 (1975) (holding that Congress did not intend to prohibit alljudicial review
of an agency's decision under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
45. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993).
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The next issue that arose under this development is what the Court
would find sufficient to establish a tradition of nonreviewability of a
category of administrative actions. The Court's first application of this
doctrine allowed for such weak evidence of a tradition that it has opened up
reviewability to the possibility of an unmoored common law process under
which federal courts would be free to exclude categories of agency actions
from judicial review based on their own view of good policy without any
real precedent. 46 Our common law tradition assumes that judges act within
a framework of accepted norms of judicial behavior, such as adherence to
precedent and fidelity to tradition, while maintaining the appropriate
deferential judicial attitude toward statutes. In this particular instance, we
would expect the Court to rely on a well-established common law tradition
of nonreviewability before it exercises its common law power to deny
review in the face of a statute that grants an entitlement to judicial review of
agency action. However, in the single case in which the Court found
nonreviewability under the categorical approach, the best support it could
muster for the tradition of nonreviewability (of agency allocations of funds
from lump sum appropriations) was a citation to a 1975 opinion by the
Comptroller General deciding a government contract protest. 47 No judicial
opinion supported the Court's conclusion that the category of allocation of
48
funds from lump sum appropriations had been traditionally unreviewable.
There were two more straightforward paths to the decision, both with
more statutory orientations. The Court might have said that the very
nature of a lump sum appropriation is that there is no law to apply to the
allocation of funds among permissible agency objectives. It might have also
said that the nature of a lump sum appropriation is to assign final discretion
over allocation to responsible agency officials. Rather than take either of
these more constrained paths, the Court chose to adopt the reasoning that
maximized its common law power to determine when judicial review is not
available. 49 Perhaps the intent was to let Congress and the agencies know
who's boss.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 192 (citing LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307, 319 (1975)).
Id.
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court in Lincoln also left open the possibility that

judicial review of the allocation of funds from lump sum appropriations might be available if
an agency goes beyond statutory bounds. See id., 508 U.S. at 193 ("[A]s long as the agency

allocates funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet permissible statutory objectives,
§ 701(a)(2) gives the courts no leave to intrude. '[T]o [that] extent,' the decision to allocate
funds 'is committed to agency discretion by law."') (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006)).
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3. Standing to Seek JudicialReview
Both the APA and the U.S. Constitution play a role in determining
whether a party has standing to seek judicial review of agency action in a
federal court. Standing involves the requirement of a case or controversy
50
for federal court jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.
Standing also involves a set of nonconstitutional requirements, some
deriving from the APA5 1 and some from general prudential concerns. 52 In
both areas, the Supreme Court has adopted unclear and malleable
common law standards, allowing courts great freedom in making standing
determinations. 53 Contrary to the usual hope for increased clarity in
common law reasoning over time, the criteria for standing have not been
refined in a way that has led to clarity or predictability in the law of
standing either under the APA or the Constitution.
The APA specifies that a "person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
54
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof"
Uncertainty exists over the meaning of "adversely affected or
aggrieved... within the meaning of a relevant statute." 55 Does this
language liberalize standing, allowing anyone injured by agency action to
seek judicial review, or does it require that a person seeking judicial review
identify a statutory source outside the APA for the right to review?
Pre-APA law was very restrictive, rarely granting standing to third
parties such as competitors. 56 The Supreme Court has interpreted the APA
to liberalize standing substantially, holding that by within the meaning of a
relevant statute, § 702 requires that the adversely affected or aggrieved
"complainant [be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute. ' 57 While standing is generally not an impediment
50. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he core
component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.").
51. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-96 (1987) (discussing APA
standing rules).
52. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (discussing prudential standing
limitations).

53. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
54.

5 U.S.C. § 702.

55.

Id.

56. See, e.g, Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 254-55
(1930) (denying shippers standing to challenge an agency decision that set rates charges for
other shippers).
57. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). It is not
completely clear that the APA is the source of the zone of interests test since more recently,
the Court has characterized the test as a generally applicable prudential standing
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to litigation by the direct subject of regulation seeking judicial review, this
liberalization is important for third parties who are affected by the
regulation of others. These parties include business interests complaining
about lenient regulation of competitors and environmentalists complaining
about lenient environmental regulation.
What does it mean for a third party to be "arguably within the zone of
interests" of a statute? The Court looks at multiple factors including the
language, purpose, and history of the statute to determine whether the
plaintiff is within a category of those meeting the zone of interests test. The
Court has not been clear about what it actually requires, sometimes looking
for affirmative indications that Congress intended to include the party
seeking review within the zone of interests and other times looking mainly
for evidence of whether Congress meant to exclude an affected party from
the class of parties eligible to seek judicial review. In the most recent
application in a statutory context, the Court held that voters were within
the zone of interests of a law requiring political action committees to
disclose certain information, concluding, "We have found nothing in the
Act that suggests Congress intended to exclude voters from the benefits of
these provisions, or otherwise to restrict standing, say, to political parties,
candidates, or their committees." 58 This holding implies that adversely
affected parties are within the zone of interests unless there is affirmative
evidence that Congress meant to exclude them from having standing.
Although the Court did rely on the language of the statute and its purpose
to conclude that Congress intended to include voters within the statute's
purview, in earlier cases the Court stated that "there need be no indication
of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff' for the plaintiff
59
to meet the zone of interests test.

In another decision, however, excluding postal workers' unions from
standing to challenge the U.S. Postal Service's decision to surrender part of
its statutory monopoly to competitors, the Court denied standing because it
could not find affirmative evidence in the relevant statute or legislative
history that workers' interests were meant to be considered in the
decision. 60 The Court is thus unclear on whether affirmative evidence of
inclusion is required for standing, or whether it is sufficient that there is no
evidence that Congress intended to exclude an adversely affected or
requirement, stating that it applies even in cases that do not arise under the APA. See Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, 17 (2004).
58. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
59. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n., 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987) (citing Inv. Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)).
60. Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 52830(1991).
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aggrieved party. The Court could have made this a statutory inquiry,
focused on whether there is evidence in a statute or legislative history that
Congress intended to benefit, or at least was concerned about, the plaintiffs
class. Instead, the Court constructed a common-law-like test with multiple
and sometimes conflicting factors calling for the exercise of policy judgment
for its application.
In constitutional standing, the Court has constructed a common-law-like
jurisprudence that is even less clear in application than the statutory and
prudential standing tests. There are three basic constitutional requirements
for standing: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury, the injury must have
been caused by the challenged conduct, and the injury must be redressable
by a favorable judgment. 6 1 Although these criteria appear relatively clear,
in practice they have been very pliable and have produced divided courts
and wildly inconsistent results.
The classic examples of the pliability of the constitutional standing
requirements are the roughly contemporaneous decisions in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatorg Agency Procedures (SCRAP)62 and Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO).63 In each case, an interest
group challenged regulation of third parties that allegedly affected members
of the group indirectly. In SCRAP, a group of law students concerned with
the environment challenged the Interstate Commerce Commission's
decision to increase freight shipping rates, alleging that the increase would
impede recycling by making it more expensive, which in turn would lead to
64
more garbage in parks they used and more pollution generally.
Remarkably, the Supreme Court held that this chain of argument was
sufficient to establish standing. 65 In EKWRO, welfare advocates challenged
the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of the requirement that
nonprofit hospitals provide free care to patients unable to pay, alleging that
66
The
lax enforcement made it difficult for members to receive free care.
Court held that this set of allegations was insufficient to establish standing,
largely on the ground that there was no guarantee that even with stricter
enforcement the patients would be able to obtain free care. 67 This may be
so, but it is difficult to see how this is more speculative than the argument
that lower freight rates would lead to more recycling, less litter and less
pollution. Recently appointed Chief Justice Roberts complained that the
61.
62.
63.
64.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 678-80.

65.

Id. at 685-87.

66. EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 32-33.
67.

Id. at 43-44.
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Court had returned to the excesses of SCRAP by allowing the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts standing to challenge the refusal of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions, based on the possibility that reducing carbon dioxide emissions
from cars would reduce global warming and thus reduce erosion of the
Massachusetts coastline.68
One aspect of EKRWO helps explain both the appearance of
inconsistency, and the controversial nature of standing cases at the Court.
Justice Stewart, concurring in the EKRWO decision, commented, "I cannot
now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a
person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to
litigate the federal tax liability of someone else." 69 Why not, and why the
exception for the First Amendment?
Because the injury-causationredressability requirements for standing are proxies for broader
considerations concerning the proper role of the courts in deciding matters
of government policy. While normally courts have no role to play when a
third party complains about the tax treatment of someone else, the First
Amendment's restrictions on the establishment of religion are important
enough to justify an exception. Some decisions of the 1960s stressed that
standing is concerned primarily with ensuring the adverseness necessary to
make out a constitutional case or controversy. 70 However, when the Court
began to pull back on the most liberal standing doctrines of that period, it
explained that standing is also concerned with separation of powers,
71
It
namely with keeping courts within their proper role in government.
should, therefore, not be surprising that standing decisions can be divisive
and inconsistent, given the diversity and strength of views on the basic issue
of the proper judicial role. Any attempt to confine the doctrine in a rulebound fashion will likely fail. What we have seen and are likely to continue
to see in standing is a common-law-like elaboration of the standards for
injury, causation, and redressability that appears to depend less on the
content of the standards than the views of the Justices on the
appropriateness of standing in a particular case.

68. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 547-48 (2007) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
69. EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart,J, concurring).
70. See, e.g.,
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) ("[I]n terms of Article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether
the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable ofjudicial resolution.")
71. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ares. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982) (discussing the relationship between Article III
standing and separation of powers).
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4. Timing ofJudicialReview
Case law on the timing ofjudicial review is a study in contrasts. On the
one hand, the Court has created a ripeness doctrine of dubious pedigree
and highly uncertain standards while, on the other hand, the Court has
taken a statutory approach to the requirement that those seeking judicial
review exhaust their administrative remedies before going to court. Let us
look first at exhaustion and then at ripeness.
The requirement that parties seeking judicial review of agency action
exhaust their administrative remedies before going to court is one of the
pillars of the common law of judicial review. The leading case on
72
exhaustion is the pre-APA decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.
In that case, the National Labor Relations Board charged Bethlehem with
unfair labor practices. Rather than seek a hearing on the complaint before
the Board, Bethlehem went straight to federal court to enjoin further
administrative proceedings on the ground that it was not engaged in
interstate commerce and thus not within the Board's jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court held that Bethlehem should have sought relief first in the
agency, based on a well-established common law requirement of
exhaustion. In response to Bethlehem's arguments for immediate judicial
intervention, the Court stated: "The contention is at war with the long
settled rule ofjudicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
'73
remedy has been exhausted.
Courts continued to apply the common law requirement of exhaustion,
with its exceptions, to a wide variety of challenges to administrative
action. 74 In APA cases, however, there was a factor that was lacking in
many other contexts: the APA contains a provision that governs the timing
of judicial review, establishing that agency action is final when the
petitioner has exhausted those administrative remedies expressly provided
for by statute or agency rule. 75 Because the APA provides that aggrieved
parties are entitled to review of final agency action, the Supreme Court
held that in cases arising under the APA, courts are not free to impose
common law exhaustion requirements, but rather must follow the APA
when determining whether the time is right for judicial review. 76 In a sense,

72.

303 U.S. 41 (1938).

73. Id.at5O-51.
74. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (reviewing the option of
administrative action through the Federal Bureau of Prisons for a case involving a federal
prisoner and his right to initiate a suit).

75.

5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).

76.

Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993).
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the APA's statutory finality provisions have displaced the common law
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The statutory turn in exhaustion is the jumping-off point for John
Duffy's claim that administrative procedure generally is becoming more
statutory in focus. 77 This statute-based exhaustion regime stands in marked
contrast to the Court's ripeness jurisprudence. Early on in the life of the
APA, the issue arose as to whether a regulated party may seek judicial
review immediately upon the issuance of an unfavorable rule, or whether
the party must await an enforcement action to challenge the rule. The
APA's statutory provisions, in fact the same ones relevant to the exhaustion
inquiry, support immediate review-the issuance of a rule is a final agency
action, and normally once a rule is issued, no statute or rule requires appeal
to a higher agency authority before judicial review may be sought. The
issuance of a rule is the end of the administrative line.
Despite the strength of these statutory arguments, the Supreme Court
has constructed a common law standard governing whether a regulated
party may seek immediate review of a rule or must await enforcement
before challenging it. Although the Court acknowledged that the issuance
of a rule is final agency action within the meaning of the APA-and thus
would be subject to immediate review under the Court's exhaustion case
aw 7 8 -the Court stated that a pre-enforcement challenge to a rule is not
ripe unless the issues are fit for judicial review and the complainant would
79
suffer serious hardship if review were delayed until after enforcement.
The Court characterized its ripeness doctrine as a matter of judicial
discretion, and it has continued to apply the doctrine even after recognizing
that exhaustion is governed by statute and rule rather than discretionary
legal doctrines. 80 Thus, in the related areas of ripeness and exhaustion of
administrative remedies, we find radically different methods, with one area
governed by statute and the other governed by common law standards.

77. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 160. Davis cited the law of exhaustion of remedies as an
example of administrative common law, but that was before Darby v. Cisneros rejected the
common law doctrine of exhaustion in cases governed by the APA. See Davis, supra note 4,
at 8.
78. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) ("[T]he regulations in issue
we find to be 'final agency action' within the meaning of § 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704..
.
79. Id. at 148-49.
80. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (concluding
that a challenge to final rules was ripe because the relevant statute explicitly provided for
pre-enforcement judicial review).
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II. STANDARDS AND SCOPE OFJUDICIAL REVIEW
The APA contains an apparently comprehensive set of standards of
judicial review that apply across the spectrum of administrative action, 81
unless they have been displaced by another statutorily applicable standard.
Although these statutory provisions outline the standards that govern the
scope ofjudicial review, the actual meaning of the standards has developed
in a common law fashion, sometimes with little attention to the language of
the governing statute. In the interest of space, the focus here is on three
issues: the standard of review that is applied to agency decisions of statutory
interpretation, the meaning of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, and
the circumstances under which de novo review is available.
A.

Review of Questions ofAgency Statutory Interpretation

Over the past twenty-five years, perhaps the greatest change in U.S.
administrative law, at least as a formal matter, has been the creation and
development of the "Chevron doctrine" 82 for judicial review of questions of
agency statutory interpretation. This doctrine is the quintessential common
law creation, created with only a passing nod to the statutory standard that
governs the matter and then developed without further reference to the
statute. 83 The reason for the qualifier, that the change may only be formal
rather than substantive, is that it is not clear how much the change in the
standard has affected judicial or agency behavior. There is no question
that Chevron has drastically affected the way cases are argued to the courts,
and how the issue is discussed within the scholarly commentary, but what is
unclear is whether, especially at the Supreme Court, Chevron has actually
84
had much impact on how cases are ultimately decided.
Chevron itself involved the EPA's interpretation, in a rule issued after
notice and comment, of the term "stationary source" in a provision of the
Clean Air Act. After the D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's interpretation, the
Supreme Court heard the case and issued what appeared to be a
revolutionary new standard for judicial review of agency statutory

81.
82.

5 U.S.C. § 706.
Named for the Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
83. Justice Scalia, whose behavior indicates that he is not very happy with judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretations, has stated that Chevron was not "observant of
the APA's text." See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 242 n.2 (2001) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting).
84. For a general look at Chevron and an argument that the doctrine isa failure and
should be abandoned, see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failedand Wy It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REv. 779 (2010).
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construction. The Court created a two-step standard. The first step is to
determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." 85 If,
however, "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue," the reviewing court enters the second step in which it must defer to
an agency's "permissible construction" of a statute if the statute is either
"silent or ambiguous" on the issue before the court. 86 So far, the statute
that governs the scope ofjudicial review has not made an appearance.
The Court's opinion elaborates on the second step's deferential standard
by separating congressional silence and ambiguity into two categories: one
in which Congress has "explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill" and
another in which the gap is implicit.8 7 In the case of explicit gaps, the
Court almost mentions the governing statute when it states that regulations
filling an explicit gap "are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 88 This quoted
language is a paraphrase of APA § 706(2)(A)'s "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" standard.
Notice that "otherwise not in accordance with law" becomes, in the Court's
words, the much more deferential sounding "manifestly contrary to the
statute." 89 The Court did not elaborate on what it meant by "manifestly."
Perhaps it meant "facially" or "obviously," as the term implies. In addition,
the Court completely ignored the APA's admonition that "the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions." 90
The development of the Chevron standard continues the pre-APA
tradition at the Court of creating conflicting common law standards
regarding review of agency decisions on questions of law. The Court has
long oscillated between the view that statutory interpretation is a judicial
function, and highly deferential standards of review like Chevron, sometimes
stopping temporarily at points in between the two extremes. 91 This has
continued even after Chevron. Soon after Chevron was decided, the Court
85.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.

86. Id. at 843.
87. Id. at 843-44.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 844.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
91. Compare United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940) (stating
that statutory interpretation is a judicial function), with NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322
U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (noting that statutory interpretation is a judicial function, but that
courts should give "appropriate weight" to agency decisions), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that while agency decisions are not binding on the courts,
courts may rely on these decisions for guidance).
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explained that in determining whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue, the Court should employ "traditional tools of
92
statutory construction" such as the canons and other interpretive devices.
The Court no longer required that Congress actually mention the issue in
question in the statute or its legislative history to find that Congress had
directly spoken to that precise question at issue. This makes it much more
likely that the Court will find clear congressional intent, which under
Chevron "is the end of the matter," 93 and will apply this intent regardless of
94
the agency's views.
The Court has also constructed an elaborate jurisprudence of when
Chevron applies and when it does not. 95 While the Court's analysis purports
to be based on Congress's intent, the level of deference is influenced by
congressional intent much less today than it was in the pre-APA period
when a clear convention that Congress could easily follow existed. 96 Under
current law, the Court uses indirect evidence-mainly the level of
procedure required by Congress-to determine whether Congress intended
for courts to defer to agency statutory interpretations. This construction is
based on the supposition that the more procedure Congress required, the
more it intended that judicial review of statutory decisions be deferential.
Even within this framework, the Court has maintained a great deal of
discretion, refusing to set hard and fast standards for when Chevron applies
97
and when it does not.
Finally, when the Court decides that Chevron does not apply, its analysis
reverts to the pre-APA Skidmore doctrine, under which the reviewing court
decides whether to defer to the agency's interpretation based on all the
factors that might be considered relevant to whether the court ought to
defer to the agency's interpretation. 98 AsJustice Scalia points out, this is no

92. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
94. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 550 (1996) and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 233 (1994), for examples of cases in which the Court has
found clear legislative intent despite the fact that Congress did not mention the precise issue
in question.
95. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (2001) (enumerating
rulemaking and adjudication cases where Chevron deference has been applied).
96. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Ageny Rules with theForce of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 493, 545-46 (2002) (describing the past
standard by which Congress would expressly signal when it was granting regulatory
authority and how the courts now find regulatory authority in congressional ambiguity).
97. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (holding that lack of a certain procedure alone does not
determine Chevron applicability).
98. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that the level of a
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legal test at all, but rather simply tells the courts to decide based on
whatever they find relevant. 99 More to the point for present purposes, the
standard has no connection to the APA or any other statute, and there is no
reason to believe that a court applying the Skidmore standard is likely to
defer when and only when Congress wants it to.

B. Review Under the Arbitrary and Capricious Test
The catchall standard that governs judicial review of agency action,
which applies to most cases not involving formal agency adjudication, is the
arbitrary and capricious test, spelled out in the APA as whether the agency
action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 100 In the Court's most comprehensive
pronouncement on the meaning of this standard, it stated that in addition
to making sure that the agency has acted within the scope of its authority,
the reviewing court
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment....
Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 01
While this standard is based on the statute, the Court did not parse the
APA's language and elaborate on the meaning of "arbitrary," "capricious,"
or "abuse of discretion." Rather, it used the statute as a jumping-off point
for the creation of what appears to be a sensible standard for reviewing the
substance of agency decisions.
In subsequent decisions, the Court has elaborated on this standard in a
common law fashion, without any claim that the developments result from
the language or intent of the APA. For example, in a decision invalidating
the rescission of a rule requiring airbags in new automobiles, the Court
stated that the arbitrary and capricious standard requires that the agency
"examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made." ' 10 2 The "rational connection" language is quoted from a

court's deference to agencies is determined by a totality of the circumstances test).
99. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "Mead Court
effectively replaced the Chevron doctrine with the Skidmore..
100. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
101. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
102. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
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Supreme Court opinion applying the substantial evidence standard of
review to a formal agency adjudication, 10 3 which is supposed to be a more
stringent standard of review than the arbitrary and capricious test. In a
more recent decision applying the standard, the Court reversed the EPA's
decision not to take action against greenhouse gases on a similar basis-that
the agency had not provided a "reasoned explanation for its refusal to
104
decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change."'
The meaning of the arbitrary and capricious test is thus derived from
decisions applying an altogether different standard of review which is
supposed to be less deferential to agency decisions. This illustrates how
little regard the Court has for the statutory standards it is applying as it
develops its common law of judicial review.
C. De Novo Review
The APA provision on de novo review is an example of a situation in
which the APA has been construed to create a wholly new doctrine,
rejecting pre-APA common law standards. The APA states simply that
agency action should be set aside when the agency decision is
"unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court." 10 5 The APA says nothing about when this is
true-that is, when facts are subject to trial de novo. The Supreme Court,
relying on a legislative report from the House of Representatives that cites
no case law, has stated that trial de novo is available in two circumstances:
first when agency fact-finding procedures are inadequate in an adjudicatory
matter, and second when new issues are raised in a proceeding to enforce
an order issued as a result of a nonadjudicatory agency proceeding. 0 6 The
Attorney General, in the well-known 1947 Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act, vehemently disagreed with the House Report's
description of this provision, stating that "the language of [§ 706], 'to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court,'

103.

Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168.

104. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). This was under the Clean Air
Act's own statutory standard of review which contains the exact same language as the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2006).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F).
106. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415 (citing H. R. REP.No. 79-1980, at
45 (1946)). Interestingly, while the House Report explains what the APA provision means, it
cites no authority for its explanation.

The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative

Procedure Act, however, supports its view with pre-APA case law and a careful reading of the
statutory language. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 109-10 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL] (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(F)).
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obviously refers only to those existing situations in which judicial review has
consisted of a trial de novo."' 0 7 According to the Manual, "existing
situations" refers to "situations where other statutes or the courts have
prescribed such review." 10 8 The reference to previous action by courts
implicates pre-APA common law. The Manual posits that the House
Report is based on an unenacted previous version of the de novo
provision. 109
This disagreement between the Executive Branch on one side and
Congress and the Supreme Court on the other occurs along two axes. The
first is an unsurprising disagreement over the scope of review, with the
Executive Branch arguing for narrower review than contended for by
Congress and the Court. The second is along a different axis of method.
The House Report, as adopted by the Court, explains the language and
intent of the APA without drawing any connection to the preexisting
common law or any other precedent. The Manual, by contrast, urges a
more common law focus, reading the de novo provision as incorporating
the pre-APA understandings of when de novo review is available. In this
case, the Manual is more faithful to the language of the provision, while the
Court pays more attention to the House Report than to the statutory
language.
D. Dynamic Statutoy Interpretationand the APA
Given the concentrated attention in Congress and beyond that led to the
enactment of the APA, this discussion should lead to the question of why
the courts have strayed so far from the statutory language of the APA. As
we have seen, in the early years, at least with regard to some provisions,
courts were careful to stick pretty closely to the language of the statute. But
as time went on, even with regard to those provisions, the courts applied
more of a common law methodology with the statute providing at most a
jumping-off point. The role of the statute is merely to authorize the court
to rule on the issue under its own principles.
This movement away from strict application of the meaning and history
of the APA should not be surprising for several related reasons. As William
Eskridge explained in his landmark book Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, as
statutes age and the political background changes, the meaning of a statute
may evolve toward a more contemporary understanding of the language

107.
108.
109.
that was

ATrORNEY GENERAL'SMANUAL, supra note 106, at 109.
Id.at 110.
See id.at 109-10 (discussing how the legislative history repeatedly cites language
omitted by the Senate Committee).
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and values underlying the statute. 110 When the enacting coalition is still
present, courts are more likely to stick closely to the plain meaning and
intent underlying a statute. Reasons for this include the fact that the judges
share the views of the political community that enacted the statute, judges
may be concerned about criticism or even being overruled by statute if they
do not apply a statute as the enactors anticipate, and the fact that when a
statute is relatively new, judges may have an easier time discerning the
meaning of the statute and how the legislature intended it to apply to the
issues that led to the statute's enactment.
As a statute ages, as we have seen with the APA, courts may move away
from strict application, again for several reasons. For one, with the passage
of time, judges may be less able to discern the intent of the enacting
legislature, especially if the language of the statute is not crystal clear.
Further, new problems may arise, inviting application of the statute in
unanticipated situations. Similarly, problems that were serious or seemed
important to the enacting legislature may no longer be or seem important
as social conditions and political views change over time. Political views
may change so that the enacting legislature's solution to a problem may no
longer seem sensible years later, and if the enacting coalition is no longer
present, judges may feel free to be creative because they are less likely to be
statutorily overruled, or even criticized, for not following the original
legislative intent.
More specifically with regard to the APA, the fact that administrative
procedure received such concentrated attention in Congress when it
enacted the APA in 1946 may not seem so important to the courts more
than fifty years later. Courts today may be more sensitive to procedural
fairness considerations in administrative law, especially as the
administrative state continues to grow and touch more and more aspects of
Further, the increased complexity and importance of
society.
administrative action may convince some judges and observers that more
attention to process, and more stringent judicial review, is necessary. While
judicial activism in administrative law has been criticized on several fronts,
most notably for contributing to the "ossification" of rulemaking,"l' there is
not really a threat of a serious backlash due to the passage of time since the
APA was enacted. In sum, the federal courts are relatively free to impose
their own policy views in the area of administrative law and procedure.
110. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
13-80 (1994) (discussing the movement away from originalism and toward a more fluid
concept of statutory interpretation).
111. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossjing" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE LJ. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossift Agenqy
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995).

ADMINISTRA TI VE LA WREFVEW

[
[63:1

Administrative law is unlikely to return to a strict statutory focus.
CONCLUSION

In 1980, Kenneth Culp Davis mustered eight separate reasons for his
prediction that the Vermont Yankee decision requiring a statutory focus in
judicial review of administrative procedure would ultimately be rejected in
favor of a common law orientation. Two of them merit attention here.
The first, his fifth, is that "[a]ny effort to stifle judicial creativity is
profoundly incompatible with the nature of the judicial process." ' 1 2 The
second, his last, is that ingrained pre-APA common law and the APA itself
allow courts to set aside agency action that is either procedurally or
substantively arbitrary and capricious, and Vermont Yankee goes against the
grain by cutting off review of procedural decisions except when the
allegation is that the agency did not follow applicable statutes and rules.113
Davis was both right and wrong at the same time. He was wrong in the
sense that the law has not explicitly rejected Vermont Yankee and has in fact
reaffirmed it every time the issue has arisen. He was correct, however, in
his identification of the predominance of common law in administrative law
despite the existence of the APA (and the occasional appearance that the
federal courts were enforcing it) rather than applying a common law of
judicial review. Davis's accurate characterization of the inherently creative
nature of the judicial process probably explains why in the more than thirty
years since the Vermont Yankee decision, the doctrine has been confined to a
relatively narrow space within administrative procedure, with only the
smallest of steps toward a more comprehensive statutory focus.
The more recent views of John Duffy on the role of common law in
judicial review are similarly partially correct and partially incorrect. Duffy
rightly points out that the turn toward a statutory focus concerning
exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review throws the
ripeness doctrine exemplified in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner into question.
If the APA's finality requirements displace the common law of exhaustion,
they ought also to displace nonstatutory ripeness doctrines. However,
Duffy is incorrect insofar as he predicts that statutory law--or as he phrases
it, the "supremacy of legislation"-is ascendant in administrative law.114 In
particular, the nonstatutory fitness and hardship test from Abbott Laboratories
continues to be applied to determine whether final agency action is ripe for
review; 15 equally, the notice cases in the courts of appeals apply standards
112. Davis, supra note 4, at 14.
113. Id. at 15.
114. Duffy, supra note 5, at 161.
115. See, e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (concluding
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that are far removed from the statutory language. More generally, Darby v.
Cisneros did not set off a movement toward statutory administrative law any
more than Vermont rankee did. Rather, as before, pockets of administrative
law are statutory and other pockets are common law, and courts apparently
do not feel the need to justify or even acknowledge the apparent
methodological contradictions.
We are left with the question this Article started with: Is the
methodological dichotomy upon which my analysis is built real, or simply a
reflection of different, but acceptable, traditions in judicial method?
It is plausible to argue that there is no great dichotomy, but rather
disparate approaches that occur frequently in our legal system, in which
judicial opinions are often more important than the text of any particular
statutory or constitutional provision. In the area of rulemaking procedure,
for example, while the unmoored methodology employed by the preVermont Yankee courts may have involved too much judicial creativity, the
decisions regarding the adequacy of the notice of proposed rulemaking
simply construe the language of the APA in light of the statute's purposes,
hardly a radical move away from fidelity to the proper judicial role. One
could see the rules regarding ex parte contacts in rulemaking not as judicial
usurpation but rather as an attempt to ensure that rulemaking remains a
fair and open procedure as intended by the authors of the APA. Without
explicit statutory approval of ex parte contacts in rulemaking, the courts are
on solid ground in regulating them in light of the policies and principles
underlying the APA. Similarly, with regard to the ripeness and availability
of judicial review, the statutes are arguably vague and incomplete, and thus
it is well within the traditions of the Anglo-American legal system for courts
to construe such statutes and fill gaps as they become apparent. 16 The
same could be said for scope of review-the courts are merely construing
statutes that do not have self-evident meanings, and doing so in the
traditional way: with attention to the statutory language, the legislative
intent, and the statute's underlying principles.
While these examples and arguments cannot be dismissed out of hand,
they do not rebut the primary contentions here: that the common law
versus statute law dichotomy is a useful lens for examining many areas of
administrative law, that the courts in many areas apply a common law
methodology while in others they apply a highly statutory focus, and that
the courts have not provided guidance on when each methodology is more

that the challenge to the final rules was ripe).
116. On traditional views of statutory construction in the United States which allow for
judicial creativity in filling gaps and construing vague terms, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOzo,
THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 127-30 (1921).
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appropriate.
In conclusion, if the past is prologue-which it usually is--administrative
law scholars and practitioners are likely to need to continue to feel
comfortable working from both a statutory and a common law orientation.

